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Abstract
This article analyses factionalism within ruling and opposition parties in Malaysia, with 
a focus on party splits and/or the toppling or near- toppling of dominant factions at 
the national level. Political parties are either composed of clientelist or programmatic 
factions or represent hybrids that combine clientelist and programmatic factionalism. 
The strength and the type of factionalism depend upon policy space and the intensity of 
control over party groups. Programmatic factionalism is more probable if policy space 
is wide. Policy space is an effect of the positioning (relatively dependent or independent 
from other parties in the coalition) and the basic ideology of a party, that is, the ma-
jor stance on religion, ethnicity, and the shape of the political system at large. If there 
is hardly any policy space, factionalism will be clientelistic rather than programmatic. 
Whether this type of factionalism arises is contingent upon the intensity of control over 
groups within the party and the availability of patronage goods. The control of party 
members is dependent upon the strength of the party leader and the centralisation 
of party organisation. This is demonstrated with reference to UMNO (United Malays 
National Organisation) (from programmatic to clientelist factionalism), some coalition 
partners of UMNO such as the MCA (Malaysian Chinese Association) (clientelist fac-
tionalism), and the Islamist PAS (Parti Islam Se- Malaysia) (programmatic clientelism). 
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Moreover, a brief analysis of East Malaysian parties in Sabah and Sarawak helps to fur-
ther elucidate the major dynamics of factionalism.
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Introduction
Malaysia offers an interesting case for a comparative within- country analysis of political 
party factionalism. The electoral authoritarian system (Schedler, 2013) has authoritarian 
and democratic features and is characterised by a multi- party system, and semi- 
competitive elections. The electoral breakthrough in May 2018, when the opposition 
coalition Pakatan Harapan (Alliance of Hope, PH) won for the first time, could be the 
beginning of a slow demise of electoral authoritarianism. This article focuses mostly on 
events before these elections.
Since then the dynamics of party politics have changed substantially. The former 
ruling coalition National Front, or Barisan Nasional (BN), for example, has lost many of 
its coalition member parties, especially those in East Malaysia. An analysis of the events 
in February 2020 with the downfall of the PH government would need an additional 
paper.1
In this article, I distinguish between programmatic and clientelist factionalism. 
Programmatic parties are quite inflexible in terms of coalition- building because they are 
not willing to sacrifice parts of their policy goals for the sake of gaining more seats. 
These parties are vote- seeking, but policy- seeking (or the achievement of lofty targets) 
is more important to them. If there are factional fights within such parties, it is usually 
about ideology. This is different in clientelist parties, where factional infighting is pre-
dominantly based on getting jobs or some material rewards.2 Extreme examples of cli-
entelist factionalism are to be found within junior BN member parties and within many 
East Malaysian parties.
To be sure, in most cases, political parties combine programmatic appeals with clien-
telist, materialist goals, but the distinction between two prototypes of factionalism helps 
to understand underlying dynamics. In Malaysia, factionalism has always been an 
important part of partisan politics, and, one might argue, factionalism lay at the heart of 
the fragmentation and collapse of the electoral authoritarian system that came with the 
2018 national elections when the BN lost its majority for the first time (Ufen, 2020). The 
victory of the PH was the result of two splits of the United Malays National Organisation 
(UMNO) and a split of Parti Islam Se- Malaysia (PAS). These splits and the subsequent 
emergence of two new parties that joined the PH as well as an UMNO split in Sabah 
were instrumental for the historical defeat of the BN.
Political parties in Malaysia are either composed of clientelist or programmatic fac-
tions or represent hybrids that combine clientelist and programmatic factionalism. For 
example, clientelist groups often try to legitimate their intra- party opposition with 
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reference to programmatic ideas. Programmatic factions build linkages by promising 
material rewards once the factional infighting has been won. One major determinant for 
the type of factionalism is policy space, which itself is shaped by the positioning of a 
party within the two- level party system consisting of coalitions (that function also as 
political parties) and the coalition member parties. The determinant for the intensity of 
factionalism is the degree of organisational control by the central leadership and the 
intensity of competition for patronage goods. Organisational control is high when the 
party leaders have effective means to dominate intra- party elections and marginalise 
opponents.
This article is structured as follows. After a short discussion of the factionalism liter-
ature and the approach chosen here, the empirical part analyses clientelist factionalism 
within BN junior member parties and in East Malaysia, the predominantly programmatic 
factionalism within PAS, and the development from a more programmatic to a more 
clientelist factionalism in UMNO. In the conclusions the main results are summarised.
Factions and Factionalism
A faction has been defined as “any relatively organized group that [...] competes with 
rivals for power advantages within the larger group of which it is a part” (Beller and 
Belloni, 1978: 419). Zariski (1960: 33) defined a faction “as any intra- party combina-
tion, clique, or grouping whose members share a sense of common identity and common 
purpose and are organized to act collectively – as a distinct bloc within the party – to 
achieve their goals.” Among these goals are patronage, “the fulfilment of local, regional, 
or group interests,” influence on party strategy or policy, and the promotion of specific 
values. Faction members are aware of the existence of the group and of common inter-
ests and goals. Interaction is formalised to a certain extent, faction members communi-
cate, and the group usually exists longer than just for a short time (Zariski, 1960: 22). 
Factions differ in terms of their origins, institutionalisation, stability, size, function, link-
ages to civil society groups, and their effects on parties and the party system (Beller and 
Belloni, 1978; Köllner and Basedau, 2006). These effects can be beneficial because they 
provide opportunities for the party rank and file to influence policy- making and they help 
to represent different interests and sharpen the programmatic profile of the party. They 
may also offer an opportunity for the party to quickly adapt to a changing political envi-
ronment. Thus, factionalism can be an expression of a democratic political culture, 
although this is dependent on the type of factionalism.
With reference to David Hume, Giovanni Sartori (1976) made a distinction between 
“factions of interest” and “factions of principle.”3 Factions of interest are based on 
patronage and better organised than mere clienteles. They subsume “naked power fac-
tions” and “spoils factions.” Factions of principle are based on policy beliefs and are 
more than simple “tendencies” (Rose, 1964). In this vein, the present article differenti-
ates between clientelist and programmatic factions; that is, factions that intend to take 
over the leadership positions within a party because of power and/spoils interests or 
factions wanting to fundamentally change the policy course and strategic objectives of 
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the party. I focus on these factions because they are much easier to detect and observe 
than smaller factions (or tendencies and clienteles).
A Two-Level Party System
The type of factionalism (clientelist or programmatic) depends on the positioning of the 
party in the two- level party system. In Malaysia, party competition is characterised by a 
two- level organisation of political parties with usually two large coalitions (in 2018 there 
were three such coalitions); only a few, smaller parties do not belong to either of these 
coalitions. UMNO joined forces with the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) during 
local elections in 1952. The partnership proved so successful that, in 1953, the leaders of 
the two parties decided to found a lasting coalition: the Alliance. Shortly before the 
national elections in 1955, the Alliance was joined by the Malaysian Indian Congress 
(MIC). Consequently, the three largest ethnically based parties combined forces and won 
fifty- one out of fifty- two seats in the polls for the Federal Legislative Council. The 
Alliance (1952 until 1973, formally registered since 1957) was succeeded by the National 
Front, or Barisan Nasional (BN, founded in 1974), which is also registered as a party. 
UMNO was predominant within the party system at large as well as in the BN.4 The 
prime minister and president of UMNO sometimes directly intervened in the internal 
affairs of BN member parties. These component parties are in a very precarious position 
because they have to represent the interests of their respective clienteles, mostly defined 
in terms of ethnicity, but have been restricted in doing this by UMNO. Thus, the exis-
tence of the BN has had a lasting impact on the structure of each component party and 
on the type of factionalism.
The coalitions coordinate the selection of candidates. In order to avoid three- corner 
fights, each coalition strives to nominate only one candidate per constituency. Moreover, 
coalitions organise their campaigns with common platforms and together they select 
office- holders after winning elections. The opposition has been organised under the 
umbrella of the Alternative Front or Barisan Alternatif, which comprises the Democratic 
Action Party (DAP), PAS and the Parti Keadilan Rakyat, People’s Justice Party (PKR)5 
(1999 until March 2004; without DAP since 2001), then as People’s Alliance or Pakatan 
Rakyat (2008 until 2015), and then as Alliance of Hope or Pakatan Harapan (since 
September 2015; without PAS, but with the Parti Amanah Negara or National Trust 
Party, PAN) (Table 1). Opposition coalitions have usually been rather fragile, but became 
increasingly cohesive in the first decade of the twenty- first century (Ufen, 2020). The 
BN, in contrast, was most of the time very stable and cohesive. The BN has indirect 
membership via component parties (approximately 450,000 members in total), a 
Supreme Council under Najib Razak, its logos, manifestos, regular meetings, and even 
youth and women’s wings. During elections, candidates campaign under the umbrella of 
the BN, but also in the name of their respective coalition member party. This two- level 
organisation has a strong impact on the factionalisation of single parties because these 
are, in a way, themselves highly organised “factions” within their respective coalitions; 
for instance, they represent certain religious and ethnic groups. Thus, inter- party and 
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inter- coalitional competition have a direct, albeit complex effect on intra- party 
competition.
Strength and Type of Factionalism
The strength and the type of factionalism depend upon policy space and the intensity of 
control of party members (Figure 1). Programmatic factionalism is more probable if 
policy space is large. If there is hardly any policy space, factionalism will be clientelistic 
rather than programmatic. Whether factionalism arises at all, is contingent upon the 
intensity of control over groups within the party. Policy space is an effect of the position-
ing (relatively dependent or independent from other parties in the coalition) and basic 
ideology of a party. “Basic ideology” denotes the major stance on religion, ethnicity, and 
the shape of the political system at large (whether democratic, authoritarian or an Islamic 
State à la PAS) and is relatively stable over time. A “thick” ideology denotes an enduring 
commitment to an elaborate system of values and policy goals. In contrast, a “thin” ide-
ology (Stanley, 2008) is merely an unsystematic, broadly formulated compilation of 
ideas.
Many political parties in Malaysia, particularly those in East Malaysia and the junior 
BN parties, have been organised from the beginning as interest groups representing 
Figure 1. Strength and Type of Factionalism.
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ethnic groups in fragile positions, that is, ethnic Chinese, Indian, Kadazandusun, Dayak, 
and so forth. Party ideology is thus not grounded in one of the traditional party families. 
An exceptions to this “thinness” of ideology is the DAP, a supposedly socialist (or social 
democratic) party, but the core ideology has lost much of its strength over the years, thus 
following a global trend. The strongest ideological commitment is characteristic of PAS, 
even increasingly so since the early 1980s, although with some breaks during times 
when PAS was part of the opposition coalitions. UMNO’s platform is ideologically rel-
atively “thick” because the party has had the opportunity to formulate the policy outlines 
over decades. UMNO was always forced to come up with detailed political programmes 
and to adapt to an environment with wide policy space, in contrast to MCA, MIC and the 
like, that is, parties who mostly followed UMNO. A wide policy space nurtures program-
matic factionalism, but tends to subdue clientelist factionalism (Figure 1).
The control of party groups is dependent upon the strength of party leaders and their 
ability to stifle factionalism because of their charisma and/or their deftness in power 
politics and the centralisation of party organisation. Moreover, the competition for dis-
posable patronage goods nurtures clientelist factionalism. If the party leader lacks cha-
risma, does not dispose of large patronage resources on his own and has to deal with a 
party organisation that always allows for open contests, factionalism will be part of the 
organisational DNA. With reference to programmatic factionalism, policy space is deci-
sive. Programmatic and clientelist factionalism may strengthen or weaken each other. It 
is thinkable, although difficult to show, that two factions based on different program-
matic platforms are interlinked via clientelist networks in a way that subdues this fac-
tionalism and vice versa. But it is also possible that clientelist networks run more or less 
parallel to programmatic factions and thus amplify rifts within a party.
Factionalism is prevented from leading to a party split or a fundamental policy switch 
if the party is centralised to such a degree that the party leader has the ability to quash 
revolt by using repressive measures or patronage. This is usually the case after the party 
performs badly at elections, during an economic crisis (which may also affect patronage 
sources), or because of scandals involving the party leadership.
If the power is concentrated in the hands of a single leader, the oppositional faction is 
likely to lose against the dominant faction (see Musil and Bilgin, 2016). Decentralised 
party organisation is not meant in a strictly geographical sense, but denotes the centrifu-
gal forces in a party resulting in a central leadership that always has to bargain and 
compromise with branches, leaders at the state level, interest groups within the party, 
and so forth. A fully centralised party would be led by one leader who controls the 
finances and is able to decide ahead of party elections who will get which position. 
Factionalism can hardly strive in such political parties. Lacking control leads to clien-
telist factionalism but can also promote a programmatic one.
Decision- making is strongly centralised within BN parties. Nevertheless, elections 
within BN parties were often hard- fought battles between different candidates who are 
supported by rank- and- file party members. The degree of centralism has changed over 
time. The presidents were most powerful after the party system was stabilised in the late 
1970s and early 1980s. The very long tenures of party presidents such as Mahathir 
Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs 39(1)66
(1981–2003), Samy Vellu (MIC, 1979–2010), Ling Liong Sik (MCA, 1986–2003), Lim 
Keng Yaik (Gerakan, 1980–2007), and Abdul Taib Mahmud (PBB, Parti Pesaka 
Bumiputera Bersatu, United Bumiputera Heritage Party, 1981–2014) are testimony to 
this.6
Personalism and centralism are also typical for many opposition parties. It is most 
obvious within the DAP, which was controlled from an early stage by Lim Kit Siang, 
who is still the respected senior leader in the background. His son, Lim Guan Eng, who 
was also Chief Minister of Penang and is now Minister of Finance, holds the position of 
secretary- general, the most important post in the party. Since a major split of the party 
never materialised, and competitors within DAP were quickly marginalised, long- 
standing factionalism or ideological divides never evolved. There are factions within the 
party, but not of the type analysed in this article. However, the centralism in the DAP, 
which has dynastic tendencies and Lim Kit Siang’s allegedly “dictatorial” leadership 
style, was criticised on occasions (Chin, 2000: 286f; Kua, 1996). In 1997, for example, 
the DAP Perak branch was divided into two factions. In 1998, a campaign under the 
label KOKS (“Kick Out Kit Siang”) was led by the National Publicity Secretary, the 
National Vice- Chairman, and the National Treasurer, and represented a direct attack on 
Lim Kit Siang. However, at the DAP delegates’ conference in August 1998, only one 
supporter of the faction was elected into the Central Executive Committee. The three 
rebels then founded the unsuccessful and- since 2008- defunct Malaysian Democratic 
Party (MDP).
Dynastic features are also observable within the PKR reminiscent of many East 
Malaysian parties and, of course, UMNO.7 The PKR is overshadowed by the former 
Deputy Prime Minister, the charismatic Anwar Ibrahim, whose arrest in 1998 was the 
reason for the establishment of the party. His wife and his daughter are in top leadership 
positions in the party. Factionalism within the PKR has been a direct result of the party’s 
origins in the Reformasi protest movement. It consisted of NGOs (moderate Islamist 
organisations, but also left- wing organisations and trade unions) and students, but also of 
people close to Anwar Ibrahim (“Anwaristas”), many of whom were former UMNO 
members. Once a political party is established, the groups that have formed the party 
sustain their existence as factions. This was obvious within the PKR at the party con-
gresses in the early firstdecade of the twenty- first century, but these pre- parties (or 
smaller, integrated parties) have since, arguably, slowly vanished as distinct groups. 
Only after the elections in 2018, when PKR has become part of the new ruling coalition, 
a strong factionalism emerged with the minister of economic affairs, Azmin Ali, on one 
side and Anwar Ibrahim on the other.
The strength of party leaders also depends substantially on their control over the 
finances of the party (Ufen, 2015). Sartori (1976) shows how decentralised party financ-
ing has encouraged multifactionalism in Japanese political parties. Governing parties in 
Malaysia have had direct access to state resources. Hence, UMNO and, to a lesser degree 
MCA and MIC, have built their own companies. Within these parties, the fight over these 
resources has intensified clientelist factionalism. Particularly within UMNO, the devel-
opment of an opaque business empire in parallel with the pro- Bumiputera8 policies of 
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the New Economic Policy (NEP) has enhanced the formation of factions that each have 
access to specific spoils and are connected to certain cronies (Gomez, 2002). This was 
obvious in 1987 and 1998. The opposition parties are generally rather poor. Only as 
governing parties at the state level do they gain access to patronage resources, but these 
are restricted because the Malaysian administrative and fiscal structure is strongly cen-
tralised. According to this logic, factions may emerge in order to demand a greater share 
of spoils or to gain direct access to financial resources.
Political parties face constraints in determining policy positions. There are “very real 
limits to the absolute size of the issue agenda available to politicians in any one time and 
place to differentiate themselves in the eyes of inattentive voters” (Lowery et al., 2013: 
386). The policy or agenda space “is itself to a considerable degree exogenously deter-
mined, temporally sticky, and likely limited in scope” (Lowery et al., 2013). In Malaysia, 
this policy space is largely dependent on the position within the party system.9 Most 
parties clearly sided with the BN or the opposition, especially in West Malaysia. 
Exceptions have been Gerakan and PAS (from 1973 until 1977), which switched to the 
BN after the riots in 1969. Ethnic and religious cleavages have been softened by a “bar-
gain” among BN parties, but also to a lesser extent among opposition coalition partners. 
These cleavages have not divisive within all these parties. The need to nominate only one 
candidate by each coalition at the constituency level have had centripetal, bonding 
effects. Different parties need to agree on one candidate and to support him or her during 
the campaign. Grand coalitions straddle ethnic, religious and other social divides. 
Therefore, ideological factionalism is often weak because it is reflected as competition 
between parties. Programmatic work is subdued, particularly if a party is a component 
member of BN.
Clientelist Factionalism Within Dependent BN Parties
Within MCA, Gerakan and MIC, clientelist factionalism has always been strong. As 
junior partners of UMNO within the ruling coalition, these parties have been dependent 
upon UMNO. UMNO leaders have even intervened on occasions to ensure obedience by 
their fellow BN members. The three partners have always been in an awkward position 
because they defined themselves as champions of minorities, even though they almost 
always had to toe the BN line and were therefore portrayed by opposition parties as 
traitors.
The Malayan Chinese Association was formed in February 1949 with the support of 
the British colonial administration (Heng, 1988: 54ff). The first MCA members 
belonged predominantly to the Chinese bourgeoisie. At that time, MCA was a welfare 
organisation that helped the British, for example, in relocating half a million Chinese 
to the New Villages as part of the campaign against the Communist guerrillas. In 1952, 
MCA worked together with UMNO at municipal elections in Kuala Lumpur. The suc-
cess of this cooperation inspired political leaders to form the Alliance. The new coali-
tion then won with a wide margin in the first general elections in 1955. In 1958, Lim 
Chong Eu replaced Tan Cheng Lock as party president. This resulted in a party split 
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when Lim attempted to strengthen the role of MCA within the Alliance with reference 
to the allocation of candidacies in elections. Lim finally resigned as president, left the 
party in 1960, founded the unsuccessful United Democratic Party, and was later instru-
mental in the formation of Party Gerakan in 1968. The emergence of the DAP in the 
1960s narrowed the voter base of the MCA. In addition, MCA’s position within the 
Alliance was profoundly undermined by the electoral losses in 1969, the establishment 
of the BN and the entry into BN by Party Gerakan, which also had a large Chinese 
following (Heng, 1988: 265ff). Moreover, in the wake of the NEP the MCA lost its 
function as campaign funder and had to forego strategic cabinet positions such as the 
finance, trade and industry ministries. The MCA had to situate itself between UMNO 
and DAP. It had to be pro- Chinese and pro- government at the same time, but could 
never raise more radical demands. In this situation, it was very difficult to sharpen an 
ideological profile.
Competition within the BN increased and in the early 1970s a group of dissidents left 
the party and joined Gerakan. Another factional struggle occurred in 1979 when Michael 
Chen lost in elections for the presidency. Chen later left the party with some of his sup-
porters and also joined Gerakan. This easy exit option within the competing Chinese 
parties has arguably promoted factionalism. The period between 1983 and 1985 saw a 
fierce intra- party feud with expulsions, legal suits, extraordinary general meetings, elec-
toral fraud, and so on. The next major factional tussle occurred in 1999 when the party 
was divided into a “Team A” and a “Team B.” Following mediation by Mahathir, Ong 
Ka Ting became new party president in 2003, but he resigned in the wake of the disas-
trous 2008 elections. Ong Tee Keat then assumed the post of president. His deputy Chua 
Soi Lek was suspended after being implicated in a sex VCD in 2009. In party elections 
in 2010 he became the new party president, defeating Ong Tee Keat (Lee and Pong, 
2014: 30). In 2013, MCA was not represented in the cabinet, for the first time, in accor-
dance with a prior resolution that the party would not take a ministerial position in case 
of electoral defeat. Although the new party president Liow Tiong Lai abrogated this 
decision, the incident demonstrated the reduced role of the MCA in the BN. The fierce 
struggles for the top position in the party were only shallowly based on programmatic 
differences.
According to Chin (2008: 160), in the 1980s “all the component parties in the ruling 
BN […] became impotent” and the MCA “decided to move into non- policy areas such 
as welfare work. […] The party did not bother with issues such as institutionalised rac-
ism against the non- Malays through the NEP.” The same is true for Gerakan and MIC. 
The MIC was founded in 1946 to mobilise for Indian independence, then to counter 
British colonialism.10 The party was divided by factionalism for most of its history. 
Especially in the 1970s, party congresses were notorious for ruckus, but not for program-
matic debates. The Gerakan party was founded in 1968 by the ex- MCA politician Lim 
Chong Eu and some former Labour party members. It won the state election in Penang 
in 1969 and Lim Chong Eu became chief minister. However, after the riots in 1969 and 
the declaration of emergency, the party chose to become a member of the BN. The 
moment Gerakan switched into the camp of the ruling coalition in the early 1970s, it lost 
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its autonomy and independence. Finally, when the party lost its power base in Penang in 
2008, it was rendered almost meaningless within the BN.
The BN junior partners exemplify the transition of parties in which serious policy 
questions between differing intra- party factions were discussed at the start to parties 
which have been fully tamed by UMNO and restricted in their activities by the BN 
framework of formal and informal rules. This also means that factionalism, which was 
initially often programmatic to some extent, was increasingly built only on the infighting 
of clientelist networks because policy space was strictly limited. The dependent BN 
parties are currently almost insignificant within the BN because of electoral defeat in 
2008, 2013 and 2018.
Clientelist Factionalism in East Malaysia
Sabah and Sarawak have party systems markedly different from the federal one because 
parties tend to be more personalised and based on clientelist links (Faisal, 2015; Loh 
Kok Wah, 2005). Many parties in Sabah and Sarawak only have branches in one of these 
state and not in the rest of Malaysia. The relationship between the federal and the Sabah 
and Sarawak state governments has often been tense. Political parties emerged later than 
on the peninsula and are usually not well institutionalised. The main cleavages are ethno- 
religious: “Malay/Melanau versus Dayak versus Chinese” in Sarawak, and “Malay ver-
sus Kadazandusun versus Chinese” in Sabah. A kindred distinction in the literature is 
between Muslim Bumiputera, non- Muslim Bumiputera and non- Bumiputera.
Governing parties at the state level have had, and still partly have, direct access to 
natural resources and party leaders could establish clientelist networks based on patron-
age to buy off competitors within the party and stifle factionalism. In Sabah, the federal 
BN established successively its hegemony over sometimes insubordinate proxy parties. 
In the early 1970s, the headstrong Chief Minister Mustapha (United Sabah National 
Organisation, USNO) was replaced by Harris Salleh and his new Sabah People’s United 
Front or Berjaya that had been established with the help of the federal government 
(Yusoff, 2006: 210ff). But afterwards, a burgeoning Kadazandusun ethno- nationalism, 
spurred by a new middle class, led to the establishment of the Parti Bersatu Sabah 
(United Sabah Party or PBS). It was admitted into the BN in 1986 after it had won state 
elections, but the relationship between the federal and the Sabah governments was diffi-
cult from the start. The PBS even chose to join the federal opposition led by Semangat’46 
ahead of the 1990 national elections. The PBS was finally toppled. The federal govern-
ment detained some PBS leaders, provided for party defections (probably by bribery), 
withheld development funds, re- delineated constituencies and registered illegal immi-
grants as voters (Yusoff, 2006).
Because of the tense relationship between the federal and the Sabah governments for 
most of the time, Kuala Lumpur decided to federalise the state government by bringing 
in UMNO. From 1999 until the defeat in the 2018 elections, UMNO was the hegemonic 
party in Sabah. The hegemony was much less built on the traditional form of person-
alised, timber- based patronage and more on regularised networks within and connected 
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to UMNO. At the same time, ethnic Chinese parties and those representing indigenous 
groups such as Kadazandusun increasingly split into many rivalling parties.11
In Sarawak the first parties emerged late, that is, shortly before elections to the District 
Council in 1963 (Milne and Mauzy, 1978: 167: 167ff). Since 1970, the party system was 
essentially dominated by the Sarawak BN consisting of the PBB, the predominantly 
ethnic Chinese Sarawak United People’s Party (SUPP) and some political parties that 
mostly represented Dayaks. But the role of extreme wealth of the political elite, espe-
cially by the Chief Minister Rahman Yakub (1970–1981) and billionaire Abdul Taib 
Mahmud (1981–2014) of the PBB, were instrumental in forging clientelist networks 
down to the village level (Aeria, 2005, Aeria, 2013).
Following the 1991 elections, the party system was clearly dominated by the PBB 
which won always almost half of the seats, but increasingly bolstered its position within 
the BN because the other parties tended to fragment. The continuing success of the party 
was based on money, but also on the re- delineation of constituencies, on the weakening 
of the SUPP due to DAPs successes in urban areas, and on the widespread factionalism 
within the Dayak parties. Following internal disputes, the SPDP (Sarawak Progressive 
Democratic Party) split from SNAP in 2002. The PBDS (Parti Bansa Dayak Sarawak) 
had already separated from SNAP in 1983 and split yet again into two competing wings 
that were eventually declared invalid by the Registrar of Societies. Subsequently, a new 
Dayak party was founded by a wing of the PDBS, namely the PRS (Parti Rakyat 
Sarawak, Sarawak People’s Party). In 2016, to give another example, the Parti Tenaga 
Rakyat Sarawak (Teras) (a splinter from SPDP) contested for BN, but did not officially 
join the coalition, and gained three seats in the state elections.
The governing coalitions at the state level were often much less cohesive than the BN. 
Therefore, the BN found two different solutions to the principal- agent problem. First, 
they fostered proxy parties. These proxy parties were prone to factionalism because of 
extreme clientelism. Second, they brought UMNO to Sabah.
Generally, the West Malaysian party system logic has been increasingly exported to 
East Malaysia. The best example is UMNO in Sabah (with always at least half of the 
total seats from 1999 until 2013), but also other West Malaysian parties increasingly 
succeeded. PKR and DAP got eleven and eight seats together in 2013 and 2018 in Sabah 
as well as fifteen and eleven seats together in 2013 and 2018 in Sarawak (thus forming 
the core of a slowly emerging opposition bloc). Even Gerakan (two seats in 2013) and 
MCA (with one seat in 2004 and 2008) entered Sabah. This was also a sign of weakening 
indigenous parties that were subordinate to the PBB and UMNO in Sabah within the 
state BN coalitions. Even more than at the federal level, the BN junior coalition parties 
could from time to time raise certain issues, but because of the stronger clientelism in 
East Malaysia in general, they were prone to strong clientelist factionalism. Parties such 
as Berjaya which had forcefully stressed indigenous rights were largely sidelined in the 
2000s. Ironically, the relative weakness of the federal opposition coalitions in East 
Malaysia, and the extreme hegemony by UMNO in Sabah could have ignited the defeat 
of the party in 2018 elections against the Sabah Heritage Party (Parti Warisan Sabah or: 
Warisan) that had formed an electoral pact with the Pakatan Harapan. Warisan was able 
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to portray itself as a trustworthy indigenous alternative to the West Malaysian import 
(Chin, 2018).
Programmatic Clientelism: PAS and the Predominance of 
Ideology
PAS is the only party in Malaysia with a long history of marked programmatic faction-
alism. The party “emerged from the womb of UMNO” (Noor, 2014: 40) in 1951 when, 
at an UMNO- led ulama congress, the participants decided to form the Persatuan Islam 
Se- Malaya (officially registered as Pan- Malayan Islamic Party in 1955) under the lead-
ership of the head of UMNO’s Religious Affairs Bureau, Ahmad Fuad. This move was 
obviously a reaction to the rather secular approach of UMNO. The promotion of Islam 
was amongst the goals of UMNO, yet PAS aspired to more, namely the creation of an 
Islamic state (Mutalib, 1990: 22f). However, this aim still lacked a concrete program-
matic explication.
The first major factional strife erupted in 1953 (Liow, 2009: 26ff; Noor, 2014: 42f). 
Ahmad Fuad, who supported UMNO’s ex- president, Onn Ja’afar, was forced to leave 
the party together with other party members who then joined UMNO. Afterwards, dou-
ble membership in UMNO and PAS was banned. Ahmad Fuad was succeeded by Abbas 
Elias who later invited Burhanuddin al- Helmy, a radical nationalist and once a promi-
nent activist in the anti- colonial movement, to take over the party leadership in 1956. 
Burhanuddin also had leftist, socialist inclinations and was believed to be the best choice 
to revive the party after a dismal performance at the 1955 national elections. Under him, 
the party followed a rather Malay- nationalist path without giving much leeway to dog-
matic religious scholars.
Burhanuddin was arrested under the Internal Security Act and died in 1969. The party 
leadership switched to Asri Muda (1969–1982), an ethno- nationalist who decided to 
bring PAS into the ruling BN coalition at the beginning of 1973 (Mauzy, 1983; Noor, 
2014). For him this was an opportunity to promote “Malay unity,” all the more so because 
PAS was in a difficult situation in the wake of the 1969 unrest and the following emas-
culation of the opposition. However, after a prolonged crisis in Kelantan the BN mem-
bership ended in 1977. After a motion of no- confidence, unrest in Kelantan, federal 
intervention, and fresh elections, PAS reached its historical nadir (Kamlin, 1980; Noor, 
2014: 91ff).12
“Young Turks” Take Over
Within PAS, a confluence of internal, national and international factors in the late 1970s 
and early 1980s led to the first major split and decisive programmatic change (Liow, 
2009: 33ff). The first was the disappointing leadership of Asri Muda and especially the 
decision to enter the BN. The second was the Islamisation within UMNO, which was 
accelerated with Mahathir’s co- optation of the extremely popular Islamist Anwar 
Ibrahim. The third factor was the international revival of political Islam and the parallel 
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advent of young radicals within PAS. To this faction, the programmatic radicalisation 
seemed to be the only option to strengthen the party and to win back the states of 
Terengganu and Kelantan. Eventually, the “Young Turks” (Fadzil Noor, Nakhaie Ahmad, 
Abdul Hadi Awang, Nik Aziz, etc.) took over the PAS leadership in 1982.13
From then on, the party turned against the pro- Bumiputera NEP and the alleged eth-
nic chauvinism propagated by the BN. Under Yusof Rawa, president from 1983 to 1989 
and “spiritual leader” from 1987 to 1995, PAS instead stressed the need to widen the 
scope of Islamic law, to increase the role of religious scholars (ulama) and to finally 
transform Malaysia into an Islamic State. In this vein, PAS set up a new executive com-
mittee, the Majlis Syura, to consolidate ulama power. Therefore, at least from the 1980s 
onwards, PAS consisted of at least two factions at the leadership level. One was made up 
of urban dakwah (missionary) activists, many of whom had received a Western educa-
tion; the other was led by ulama, often with a Middle East or South Asian educational 
background. The rather pragmatic faction was represented for a long time by Fadzil 
Noor, the president from 1989 until his death in 2002. He pursued an accommodative 
approach towards religious and ethnic minorities and stressed issues such as social 
inequality. Under his leadership the party forged a smaller coalition with the UMNO 
split Semangat ’46 in 1990 and 1995. In 1999, PAS toned down its views on the Islamic 
state issue and signed a reformist manifesto of the new opposition coalition, the Barisan 
Alternatif (Hilley, 2001: 196ff). This cooperation was also due to the rise of new party 
members who were socialised in an urban, multi- ethnic, and middle- class environment 
with a more secular education. Many of these reformers rose to prominent positions.
However, strong programmatic factionalism between ulama and professionals (or: 
between conservatives and reformers) was again ignited despite the electoral success of 
the opposition in 2008 and 2013. Especially after the death of the highly adored former 
chief minister of Kelantan, Nik Aziz, in February 2015, the conservative ulama faction 
around Abdul Hadi Awang grasped the opportunity to question the compromises agreed 
upon in the opposition coalition. In March 2015, PAS amended legislation to allow for 
the hudud penal code14 to be imposed in Kelantan where the party rules. Moreover, 
UMNO encouraged PAS to go ahead with a similar bill at the federal level, probably to 
manufacture the split Pakatan Rakyat. In mid-2015, during the party congress, almost all 
reformers were voted out (Mustafa, 2015). The opposition coalition Pakatan Rakyat 
came to an end. In September 2015, the reformist, non- ulama faction within PAS then 
established Amanah.
In sum, PAS had to find a balance between its Islamist ideology and the opportunity 
to be part of a strong opposition coalition that made it mandatory to tone down the 
Islamist approach. In the end, programmatic factionalism prevailed. In contrast, other 
opposition parties such as the DAP, PKR, Bersatu and Amanah were, arguably, much 
less driven by ideologies.
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UMNO: From Programmatic to Clientelist Factionalism
UMNO is an example of a predominant party that was the locus of recurring factional-
ism, a feature of the party since its inception. It was “not only chronic but had become 
systemic” (Khoo, 2003). The clientelist factions sometimes evoked wider, long- term 
policy objectives, which resulted in the hybridisation of clientelist and programmatic 
factionalism.
In 1946, UMNO emerged out of a Malay nationalist movement dominated by aristo-
crats with British education and orientation and was comprised of a range of Malay 
associations and political organisations that mobilised large sections of Malay society. 
Within UMNO, the struggle over different programmatic visions was still alive and 
eventually triggered the defection of a faction around the first UMNO president, Onn 
Ja’afar, and the foundation of the Independence of Malaya Party (IMP), which was 
expressly based on a non- communal approach to politics.15
Since independence in 1957, UMNO representing Malay interests was the dominant 
party within the Alliance. On May 13, 1969, after opposition parties had gained consid-
erably more votes in the national elections, clashes broke out. According to official 
reports, in the following weeks, 196 people died and 6,000 people, mostly ethnic 
Chinese, lost their homes (Means, 1991: 6ff). The government declared a state of emer-
gency that lasted for twenty- one months until 1971. The 1969 riots resulted in infighting 
between the old UMNO leadership under Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman and the 
so- called ultras or “ultra- nationalists” around Mahathir (Lee, 2005ff). The “ultras” 
viewed the clashes as a result of the compromising policies of the Tunku towards the 
ethnic Chinese minority. In 1970, he was able to sideline a faction around Mahathir 
Mohamad and Musa Hitam, but later gave way for Abdul Razak as the new prime min-
ister and party president (Mauzy, 1983f). The new government formulated and imple-
mented the NEP, which encompassed “affirmative action” for Bumiputera. In this way, 
it was a substantive change from a more accommodative to a Malay–communalist, 
nationalist policy (Hwang, 2003: 99f).
Factional infighting again erupted in the mid- 1970s, first against Prime Minister 
Abdul Razak, then against his successor Hussein Onn who had been perceived as rel-
atively weak. The faction leader was Harun Idris, but he was sidelined, offered an 
ambassador post and, after he rejected this, finally imprisoned because of corruption. 
When Mahathir followed Hussein Onn as prime minister in 1981, he struggled to 
achieve unity in the party. One way to do this was to ignite an extent factionalism by 
allowing open contests for the deputy presidency in order to play off some UMNO 
leaders against each other (Hwang, 2003: 128f). Within a few years, this lessened 
organisational party control led to a major factional schism. In 1987, the party was 
divided from the bottom to the top between two teams: “Team A” under Mahathir and 
“Team B” under former Finance Minister Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah. At the national 
party congress, Mahathir and his team won with a small margin, but the results were 
contested. Mahathir formed a new party, “UMNO Baru,” and provided for its quick 
official registration. Afterwards, members of “Team B” also formed a new party, 
Semangat ’46 (“Spirit of ’46”). Semangat ’46 took part in national elections in 1990 
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and 1995, but large sections of the party turned back to UMNO in the following years 
(Weiss, 2006: 107ff).
The events in 1987 were the result of a clientelist factionalism with bounded pro-
grammatic differences, though probably larger socio- economic causes (Khoo, 1995: 
261ff; Lee, 2005: 110ff; Milne and Mauzy, 1999: 39ff; Shamsul, 1988). One of the trig-
gers of the factionalism was the recession in the mid- 1980s, which resulted in fewer 
patronage resources and the loosening of clientelist ties. Mahathir, once a fiery national-
ist and strong advocate of the New Economic Policy, realised during the 1980s as prime 
minister that an overly rigid pro- Bumiputera promotion would endanger the country’s 
impressive economic growth. For politicians such as Razaleigh, this slight renunciation 
of the NEP was anathema. Seen from this perspective, the factional strife has its origins 
in divergent political strategies and perceptions (Hilley, 2001: 87). Moreover, an eco-
nomic crisis “definitely played an important role, by exaggerating the tensions both 
within and outside UMNO” (Shamsul, 1988). There was also a strong connection to the 
political financing of UMNO because Razaleigh’s criticism was directed at the financial 
wizard of UMNO, Daim Zainuddin (Wain, 2009ff).
The next fundamental and momentous factional infighting occurred within UMNO at 
the height of the Asian financial crisis. By 1998, Mahathir and his deputy, Anwar 
Ibrahim, were disagreeing more and more about crucial policy decisions (Hilley, 2001: 
105ff).16 The disputes were mostly shaped by differing interpretations of the causes of 
the Asian crisis. Anwar Ibrahim pursued strategies according to IMF prescriptions and 
challenged Mahathir’s leadership and his promotion of policies designed to rescue his 
cronies. It is not clear whether Anwar aimed to take over the party leadership. His arrest 
was a pre- emptive step by Mahathir to hinder the emergence of a major factional feud 
within UMNO. Finally, Anwar was sentenced to jail after a show trial and his followers 
were purged from UMNO.
Different policy strategies were initially of secondary importance, but the feud 
between Mahathir and Anwar got out of hand. When Anwar was sacked as deputy prime 
minister and threatened with arrest, he asked civil society groups to come to his rescue 
capitalising on his popularity (and the increasing unpopularity of Mahathir). This was 
the first time in the history of UMNO that such a conflict had triggered a social move-
ment for political liberalisation, that is, the Reformasi movement. The factionalism also 
had repercussions that fundamentally changed the party system (Ufen, 2009). In April 
1999, Reformasi gave rise to the new PKN or National Justice Party (Weiss, 2006ff). In 
June 1999, the PKN allied with PAS, the DAP, and the leftist PRM (Parti Rakyat 
Malaysia, Malaysian People’s Party) to form the Barisan Alternatif or Alternative Front.
After the ouster and defection of the Anwaristas, UMNO regained a certain unity. 
Mahathir gave way to his chosen successor Abdullah Badawi, who himself was forced 
to resign in 2009. The replacement was the logical result of UMNO’s poor electoral 
performance in 2008. The new prime minister and UMNO president Najib Razak began 
as a supposed reformer but came under pressure following the disastrous 2013 elections. 
In 2015 it emerged that under his control, the state investment company 1MDB 
(1Malaysia Development Berhad) lost billions of US$ in financial transactions. 
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Moreover, it transpired that he had received bank transfers of US$681 million into his 
private accounts ahead of the 2013 elections (Gabriel, 2018). The subsequent rift within 
UMNO saw Najib and his followers on one side, and Mahathir and his followers, inter 
alia the sacked Deputy Prime Minister Muhyiddin as well as the toppled chief minister 
of Kedah, Mukhriz Mahathir, on the other. In March 2016, Mahathir and an array of 
opposition politicians signed a 37- point People’s Declaration calling for the resignation 
of the prime minister. In September 2016, he formed the United Pribumi Party of 
Malaysia (Parti Pribumi Bersatu Malaysia, PPBM) or Bersatu that became part of the 
Pakatan Harapan in March 2017. From July 2017 onwards, Mahathir was official chair-
man of the PH and later became its candidate as prime minister for the 2018 elections.
The 1MDB crisis was a vindication of a commercialisation of party politics as well as 
the centralisation within UMNO itself (Gomez, 2009, Gomez, 2017). The prime minister 
was at the same time UMNO president and finance minister and held sway over the 
Prime Minister’s Office with its myriad of ministers, agencies and commissions. The 
complete lack of checks and balances within UMNO and the coalition denoted a funda-
mental weakness. Welsh (2018: 98ff) speaks of a deinstitutionalisation of UMNO. 
Patronage “moved from party coffers to government funds[…] and became more con-
centrated directly within the prime minister’s office[...] On the ground, party organs were 
starved of funds[...] party elections were heavily manipulated in 2013 through the use of 
money – and delayed altogether until after GE14” (Welsh, 2018: 100). This again con-
tributed to increased infighting and the split of the party.
To sum up, the first party split based on programmatic differences occurred in 1946 
when Onn Ja’afar intended to transform UMNO into a multi- ethnic party. After the 1969 
riots, Tunku Abdul Rahman was pushed out of office by a faction of politicians willing 
to introduce affirmative action for Malays. These measures and the widening of patron-
age resources resulted in an increasing impact of business interests within the party. 
Hence, UMNO factionalism in 1987 was strongly driven by clientelist networks, but was 
also to some extent connected to national policy strategies. Indeed, with the entry of 
businesspeople since the 1970s, incentives to distribute money in order to get elected by 
the party rank- and- file were increasing. This type of “money politics” is a natural breed-
ing ground for clientelist factionalism. The 1987 split was, arguably, mostly a fight for 
patronage resources. In 1998, clientelist factionalism was just starting, but it ended in a 
bitter rift between two factions with opposing political concepts for the future of 
Malaysia (Hwang, 2003). At the end, UMNO was split because of the ubiquity of 
clientelism.
Concluding Remarks
The model presented earlier (Figure 1) has identified the factors determining program-
matic and clientelist factionalism. If a party is based on a “thick” ideology and if this 
party is relatively independent from other partners within the coalition, policy space, that 
is, opportunities to re- define programmatic incentives for voters- is wide. This, together 
with a weak party leadership, facilitates programmatic factionalism. If a political party 
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has weak leaders and/or the party organisation is rather decentralised, party groups are 
hardly controllable. If, at the same time, large patronage resources are available and thus 
patronage competition is high, clientelist factionalism is usually rising. If, moreover, 
policy space is narrow, programmatic distinctions between party groups are blocked. 
The result is intense clientelist factionalism.
How exactly do we draw the line between clientelism and “real” policy issues? The 
two types of factionalism are Weberian ideal types. If, for example, patrons distribute 
club goods to members of an ethnic or religious group (as is the case with the NEP), and 
if this distribution is part and parcel of a kind of party philosophy, this type of clientelism 
is already programmatic in nature. But when, at the same time, a party like UMNO hands 
out material resources based on personal links, it is pure clientelism. Although there is 
no clear- cut distinction between clientelist and programmatic factionalism, there is a 
palpable difference between MCA- like personal feuds and the bitter acrimony between 
the reformers and ulama of PAS who represent different social milieus and have distinct 
worldviews.
Until the late 1960s, there were more programmatic choices, even among the smaller 
Alliance members. The authoritarian system allowed for more policy options, and many 
political parties were not as centralised as they would become. A narrowing of policy 
space occurred with the institutionalisation of the party system, the increasing authori-
tarianism of the political system at large, and the expansion of the ruling coalition in the 
1970s. Programmatic factionalism was increasingly subdued. Clientelist factionalism 
was also intensified within BN parties because of the NEP with its wide opportunities for 
patronage. Especially in the 1980s, this business- driven factionalism undermined 
UMNO; however, as the ruling party, it has always had more room for programmatic 
manoeuvres. Therefore, the 1987 battle had an ideological dimension. But it was the 
Mahathir–Anwar schism of 1998 that morphed into a fight not merely directed at secur-
ing patronage sources.
Since the late 1990s, Malaysian party politics has become more diversified; an end of 
electoral authoritarianism has become conceivable. Because of this, factionalism has been 
partly based on programmatic differences. Examples of this trend are the schisms in 
UMNO in 1998/1999 and 2015, and between conservatives and reformers within PAS 
since Reformasi times which finally provoked the party split in 2015. As the dominant 
party, UMNO has had more leeway to change policies, but at the same time, the increasing 
commercialisation of politics has affected the emergence of clientelist networks based on 
patronage. One could say that UMNO still shuns programmatic debates within the party 
and sidelines anyone who dares to take programmatic initiatives. Nevertheless, wider pol-
icy issues such as during the Asian crisis or in connection to the 1MDB scandal have a 
direct impact on the party. Especially since Reformasi, PAS has changed its policy objec-
tives and strategies frequently, and has oscillated between having a neutral or even pro- 
government stance and being part of the opposition that aims at regime change. However, 
it is exactly this very wide policy space that leads to programmatic factionalism. The PAS 
members who have now formed PAN are not simply disgruntled detractors, but represent 
a substantially different understanding of political Islam and approach to politics.
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The control of patronage resources stabilises the central leadership, but can also eas-
ily lead to increased factionalism because the stakes are very high. It was precisely the 
involvement of BN parties in political business that contributed to clientelism and, thus, 
clientelist factionalism. In the same vein, strong central leaders usually contain factional 
fights, but autocratic party leadership gives rise to movements by disappointed follow-
ers. The most explosive mixture seems to be weakened autocratic leadership in the face 
of disappointing electoral performance. If this is connected to relatively open intra- party 
elections, factionalism is almost guaranteed. A specific case was UMNO prior to the 
2018 elections. Although Najib was able to control this distribution in an unprecedented 
manner, it was exactly this which led to an overstretching of “money politics,” to public 
outrage over obvious corruption on a grand scale, and finally to his downfall. Another 
reason for clientelist factionalism could be the shrinking of patronage resources. The 
Team A/Team B factionalism within UMNO in the late 1980s was due to different views 
on the question “who gets what.”
If a chief patron such as Abdul Taib Mahmud (PBB) in Sarawak is in a very powerful 
position, protected by the federal government, and with a local civil society too weak to 
scandalise “money politics,” factionalism can be stifled. At times, the hegemonic UMNO 
promoted factionalism within junior partners. This was especially the case in East 
Malaysia because UMNO had to manufacture a party system with one hegemon. 
UMNOO in Sabah could only take over a predominant position within the Sabah party 
system because other parties were split and substantially weakened.
But the federal UMNO was for a long time interested in a cohesive coalition without 
much factionalism in order to guarantee electoral success. MCA, MIC, and Gerakan 
were important allies against non- Malay opposition parties, and factionalism within 
these parties always helped parties such as DAP. The junior partners within the BN have 
had a range of patronage goods and at the same time not much policy space. Therefore, 
internal fights have been focused on distribution issues and not so much on policies. The 
factional strife within parties such as MCA, MIC, and Gerakan was only subdued in 
times of very strong leadership.
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Notes
1. In February 2020, the significance of factional strife in Malaysian politics was substantiated 
when the PKR faction led by Azmin Ali left the party and joined Bersatu, which had left the 
PH.
2. On forms of clientelism, see Tomsa and Ufen (2013).
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3. See also Bettcher (2005).
4. On the classification of party systems, see Sartori (1976: 240ff).
5. At that time still under the name PKN (Parti Keadilan Nasional, National Justice Party).
6. Meanwhile, many parties had introduced term limits for their presidents (or within the DAP: 
for the secretary-general).
7. For example, the former Prime Minister Najib Razak is the son of the Second Prime Minister 
Abdul Razak.
8. Bumiputera, the “sons of the soil,” are officially composed of Malays (approximately five-
sixths of the bumiputera) and other indigenous groups (Iban, Melanau, Bajau, etc.). With the 
NEP, bumiputera are privileged in terms of business licenses, ownership structures, employ-
ment relations, and educational opportunities
9. On collective action problems of individual parties within Malaysian opposition coalitions: 
see Dettmann (2018).
10. On the MIC: see Ramasamy (2001); Loh Kok Wah (2003).
11. The vote was split by three ethnic Chinese parties as well as the ethnic Chinese wing of the 
PBS.
12. Nasir and his newly founded BERJASA party (Pan-Malaysian Islamic Front, or Barisan 
Jemaah Islamiah Se-Malaysia) joined the BN and in subsequent elections BERJASA won 
more seats than PAS in Kelantan. The party later disappeared.
13. The faction of Asri Muda was sidelined, and he founded the Parti Hizbul Muslimin Malaysia 
(or Muslim People’s Party of Malaysia, HAMIM), which was part of the BN until 1989.
14. Hudud usually refers to the class of punishments (capital punishment, amputation of hands 
or feet, and flogging) that are fixed for certain crimes such as drinking alcohol, theft, robbery, 
illegal sexual intercourse, rebellion, and apostasy (including blasphemy).
15. The IMP failed at elections. Onn Ja’afar then founded the National Party, or Party Negara, 
which also turned out to be moribund.
16. To Lee (2005): 227ff), it was a conflict between a collectivist-authoritarian and an individu-
alist-libertarian nationalism.
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